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LICENSING OF DETECTION OF DECEPTION
OPERATORS IN ILLINOIS
NEED FOR A RE-EVALUATION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POLYGRAPH
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS
ON August 23, 1963, the Illinois legislature passed an act to
provide for the licensing of detection of deception examiners
-commonly known as polygraph or lie detector operators-and
regulation of that profession.' In essence, the act sets forth the
conditions under which persons may be admitted to practice
detection of deception with a polygraph, the standards they must
observe, and the types of polygraph devices that they may hence-
forth be used lawfully. The passing of this law may well force
upon the Illinois courts a re-evaluation of the admissibility of
polygraph evidence in civil and criminal trials.
Aside from such general qualifications as to age, citizenship,
moral fitness and integrity, and absence of a criminal record, the
act requires a prospective polygraph operator to pass an exami-
nation conducted by an examination committee to determine the
applicant's competency in detecting deception with the polygraph.
Furthermore, the act provides that an applicant must have had
conferred upon him an academic degree, at least at the bacca-
laureate level, from a college or university accredited by the
Department of Registration and Education of the State of Illinois,
and must serve an internship training in polygraph testing of not
less than six months under the personal supervision and control
of a licensed examiner.
As to the types of detection of deception instruments that will
henceforth be acceptable, the act provides that only such instru-
ments that record permanently and simultaneously a subject's
cardio-vascular and respiratory patterns as minimum standards
may be used, but the instrument may record additional physio-
logical changes pertinent to the detection of deception.3 The act
further contains the usual sections designed to implement legis-
1 I11. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, § 951 et seq. (1963).
2 Id. at § 961.
3 Id. at § 953.
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lation of this type, and provides penalties for the violation of
any or all provisions of the law. So far, only two other states,
Kentucky4 and New Mexico, 5 have similar licensing laws.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNIQUES OF LIE DETECTION
The theory of the lie detector is based upon the discovery,
made many years ago, that when there is an attempt to deceive,
the blood pressure of the subject increases, his pulse rate changes,
his breathing is apt to be shallow and suppressed, and fluctuations
occur in his electrical resistance which are revealed by activity of
the perspiration glands. The polygraph instruments used today
under the popular name of "lie detector" contain at least the first
two and often the third of the following devices: (1) a blood
pressure-pulse rate test device; (2) a breathing test instrument;
and (3) a galvanograph, which registers the galvanic skin re-
sponse.
It is reported that as early as 300-250 B.C., Erasistratus, a
Greek-born physician at the royal court of Syria, attempted to
detect emotion by an observation of the pulse quickening process
during emotional states.6 In the 1890's the Swiss scientist Prof.
Carl G. Jung worked on a deception test which measured the speed
of a suspect's response, the theory being that liars hesitate before
answering. About that time other psychologists came forward with
a psycho-galvanometer test based on the idea that lying makes a
man perspire. 7 This is the same test that Father Summers of Ford-
ham University was later credited with "discovering" and which
he used in the case that lead to the first reported United States
decision where lie detector evidence was admitted.8
In this country, William M. Marston started working on the
practicability of detecting deception with the systolic blood pres-
sure test in 1915 with experimentation at the Harvard Psycho-
4 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ch. 329, § 329.010 et seq. (1962).
5 N. Mex. Stat. 67-30-17 et. seq. (1963).
6 Burack, A Critical Analysis of the Theory, Method, and Limitations of the "Lie
Detector," 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 414, 415 (1955).
7 Marston, The Lie Detector Test 33 (1938).
8 In People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Cty. Ct. 1938), discussed infra
at n.22.
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logical Laboratory.' Marston's techniques were later modified and
applied to police procedure by Dr. John A. Larson at Berkeley,
Calif., from 1921 to 1923. From 1923 to 1928, Dr. Larson con-
ducted further investigation with the lie detector in the Evanston,
Illinois Police Department and in the penitentiaries and courts of
Illinois. During this period, Marston continued his work with the
test in New York, on the West Coast, and in the Texas State Peni-
tentiary. In short order a series of lie detector devices were placed
on the market under such exotic names as: polygraph (by Larson
and Keeler) ; psychograph (by Lee) ; deceptograph (by Stoelting);
and many others.10
When in use, a lie detector records the various changes which
occur in the physical state of the subject being questioned on a
moving strip of paper. There is, of course, no such thing as a true
"lie detector." The name is used to indicate an instrument which,
when operated by a trained and experienced examiner, will help
detect deception. The instrument serves as a diagnostic aid. "Its
validity rests almost wholly upon the competency and integrity of
the operator."" Throughout the years a growing concern has been
felt for the fact that unscrupulous persons have established them-
selves as polygraph operators, using totally inadequate instru-
ments, or sophisticated devices which they do not know how to
use. Furthermore, many of these so-called lie detector operators
lack the rudimentary knowledge of the art of interrogation, and
display a total ignorance of the interpretation of polygraph records.
These practices are largely responsible for the lack of good repute
that is associated in the mind of lawyers and judges with the poly-
graph. Laws such as the one enacted in Illinois are designed to
prevent incompetent persons from operating in this field.
In an effort to upgrade the quality of polygraph examiners,
9 Marston, Systolic Blood Pressure Symptoms of Deception, 21 J. Experim. Psych.
117 (1917).
10 For a detailed study on the history of the polygraph, and the technical aspects of
mechanical detection of deception, see: Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection, 29 J. Crim.
L. & C. 848 and 30 J. Crim. L. & C. 104 (1939); Reid, Stimulated Blood Pressure Responses
in Lie Detector Tests and a Method for their Detection, 36 J. Crim. L. & C. 202 (1945);
Larson, Lying and Its Detection (1932); Marston, The Lie Detector Test (1938); Inbau,
Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (1942); Lee, The Instrumental Detection of
Deception (1953).
11 Dienstein, The Rights of the Subject in Lie-Detector Interrogation, 1 Police 41, 43
(Nov.-Dec. 1956).
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a number of reputable and experienced operators founded an asso-
ciation called the American Academy of Polygraph Examiners.
Rigorous standards for admission are set up and a code of profes-
sional ethics governs the conduct of all members. The group recog-
nizes the potential sources of incalculable harm which exist when
the instrument is used by untrained or unscrupulous persons, and
at the fourth Annual Meeting of the group in Washington, D.C.,
in 1957, the Association published a statement of principles con-
cerning the instrument to be used; the qualifications needed for
an examiner; the conditions under which tests must be made; and
the form of the examiner's report.
12
Not every subject can be successfully interrogated with the
use of a lie detector. Certain factors affect the validity of the
readings obtained with the polygraph. Well trained examiners
have learned how to spot these factors and will decline to test sub-
jects whom they feel cannot produce accurate test readings with
the instrument. This narrows the field of potential lie detector
"subjects" considerably; in criminal cases it is not unusual to see
an examiner refuse to test one subject out of five. A prominent
author on the subject of polygraph interrogation enumerates the
following factors which occasion difficulties in the diagnosis of
detection of deception with the use of a polygraph:'
8
(1) Emotional tension-"nervousness"--experienced by a subject
who is innocent and telling the truth regarding the offense in
question, but who is nevertheless affected by (a) fear induced
by the mere fact that suspicion or accusation has been directed
against him; and (b) a guilt complex involving another offense
of which he is guilty.
(2) Physiological abnormalities, such as (a) excessively high or low
blood pressure; (b) diseases of the heart; (c) respiratory dis-
orders, etc.
(3) Mental abnormalities, such as (a) feeblemindedness, as in
idiots, imbeciles, and morons; (b) psychoses or insanities, as in
manic depressives, paranoids, schizophrenics, paretics, etc; (c)
psychoneuroses, and psychopathia, as among so-called "pecu-
liar" or "emotionally unstable" persons-those who are neither
psychotic nor normal, and who form the borderline between
these two groups.
(4) Unresponsiveness in a lying or guilty suspect, because of (a)
12 The text of this "Statement of Principles" is reprinted in: Richardson, Modern
Scientific Evidence (1961), at pp. 304-307.
13 Inbau, op. cit. supra n.10, at pp. 19-25. The author has recently announced that
a new edition of his book, dealing only with the lie detector, is forthcoming.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
lack of fear of detection; (b) ability to consciously control re-
sponses by means of certain mental sets or attitudes; (c) a con-
dition of "sub-shock" or "adrenal exhaustion" at the time of
the test; (d) rationalization of the crime in advance of the test
to such an extent that lying about the offense arouses little or
no emotional disturbance.
14
THE COURTS' ATTITUDE TOWARD POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
The courts have generally been extremely reluctant in admit-
ting into evidence testimony as to the results of polygraph exami-
nations. The first appellate decision involving lie detector evidence
was rendered in 1923.11 In that case, the defendant in a murder
trial offered in evidence the results of a systolic blood pressure test
to which he had voluntarily submitted in an effort to prove the
truth of his defense. The trial court refused to permit the lie
detector operator to testify as to the results of his examination.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the trial court's ruling and said that the lie detector was
not sufficiently reliable and lacked as yet the general acceptance of
scientists. In propounding the "general acceptance" rule, still
adhered to today in most jurisdictions, Justice Van Orsdel, speak-
ing for the court, said:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general accept-
ance in the particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition .... 16
The Frye case has been followed in the great majority of
jurisdictions. Trial courts have constantly refused to admit evi-
dence of the results of lie detector tests, and their refusal has been
14 In the following twenty pages of his book, Inbau proceeds to explore these factors
in a detailed fashion.
15 Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye was convicted although
Marston was going to testify that in his opinion Frye was innocent. Later it was estab-
lished that Frye WAS innocent and was wrongly convicted of murder. 14th Annual Report
of New York Judicial Council 265 (1948).
16 Id. at 1014.
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upheld on appeal. Almost all of the courts so holding indicated
that the reason for the rejection of such testimony is that lie detec-
tion by means of a polygraph or similar device has not yet gained
such standing and scientific recognition as to justify the admission
of expert testimony deduced from tests made under such theory.'
7
Some courts have refused to admit the evidence without giving
any reason for its exclusion.'8
The reviewing tribunals have also uniformly reversed convic-
tions in criminal proceedings when the trial court had admitted,
over defendant's objection, testimony as to the result of lie detector
tests given to the defendant, " or to witnesses for the state,20 and
held the admission of such testimony into evidence to be prej-
udicial error. It has also been held that the accused's refusal to
take the lie test cannot be referred to at the trial to show the con-
sciousness of guilt on his part. Testimony of such refusal was held
to effectively deprive a defendant of a fair trial by precluding the
jury from giving a fair consideration to his defense.2'
In one of the few reported cases where a trial court admitted
the testimony of a lie detector operator, the defendant offered the
testimony in an attempt to show that he could not have committed
the crime as charged. Over the state's objection, the trial judge
17 Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929.
Accord, State v. Anderson, 261 Minn. 431, 113 N.W.2d 4 (1962); Parker v. State, 164 Neb.
614, 83 N.W.2d 347 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 933; People v. Dobler, 29 Misc. 2d 481,
215 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Cty. Ct. 1961); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495
(1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898.
18 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sadowy v. Fay, 189 F. Supp. 150, aff'd, 284 F.2d 426
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 850: lie detection tests not admissible, neither for
the state nor the defendant, even though consent given; Wilcutt v. State, 123 So. 2d 193
(Ala. App. 1961), cert. denied, 271 Ala. 315, 123 So. 2d 203; State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101,
370 P.2d 261 (1962); People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 888; State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950); Marable v.
State, 203 Tenn. 400, 313 S.W.2d 451 (1958).
19 State v. Varos, 69 N.M. 19, 363 P.2d 629 (1961). See also State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J.
Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (1961).
20 See, e.g., Mattox v. State, 240 Miss. 544, 128 So. 2d 368 (1961); Washburn v. State,
167 Tex. Crim. 125, 318 S.W.2d 627 (1960), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 965.
21 State v. Emory, 190 Kan. 406, 375 P.2d 585 (1962). Accord, Mills v. People, 139
Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998 (1959); State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962). In a
somewhat surprising departure from well established principles, the highest court in
Maine indicated, by way of dictum, in State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325, 184 A.2d 225 (1962),
that a person's refusal to take a lie detector test was admissible to show consciousness of
guilt if it is shown that such person believed the test to be trustworthy or dependable.
But in a recent Iowa decision, the court said that the refusal to take a lie detector test
may not be shown as evidence of conscious guilt similar to evidence of flight: State v.
Green, 121 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 1963).
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received the evidence and said that the time had come for the
courts to recognize the efficacy of lie detector tests where the testi-
mony of a qualified expert shows that the tests are in excess of 99
percent accurate.22 Since the defendant was acquitted, the case was
not carried to the New York Court of Appeals.
The principle of the Kenny case was repudiated in People v.
Forte,23 decided the same year, where the trial court refused to
allow an accused murderer to be given a lie detector test by the
same expert that testified in the Kenny case. On appeal the trial
court's ruling was upheld, the high court noting that the record
was devoid of any evidence tending to show a general recognition
that the pathometer possessed efficacy as an instrument for detect-
ing deception.24
There has been a slow trend, in a few jurisdictions, toward
admitting evidence of lie detector examinations where both the
prosecution and defense have agreed and stipulated in writing upon
the admissibility of the test findings prior to the taking of the test.
The first case where it was attempted to introduce evidence of a
stipulated lie test was Le Fevre v. State.25 The defendant agreed
to take a lie detector test at the request of the prosecution and
stipulated as to its admissibility in evidence. The test was favorable
to the defendant but the prosecution was not satisfied and re-
quested another test before a different expert, to which the
22 People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Cty. Ct. 1938). The expert witness,
Prof. Walter Summers of Fordham University, used a psychogalvanometer (pathometer)
and claimed that his findings of accuracy were based upon a study covering 6000 individ-
ual tests. His estimates are generally considered exaggerated. It also might be pointed
out that the pathometer records only galvanic skin response and nothing else. Such a
device does not qualify for use in Illinois under the present law.
23 167 Misc. 868, 4 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Cty. Ct. 1938).
24 People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938). The expert proposed to use
the pathometer, an instrument not presently used.
25 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943). The Illinois Supreme Court, in a decision
rendered in 1963, but before the enactment of the act providing for licensing of poly-
graph operators, was faced with a similar problem in People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302,
189 N.E.2d 260 (1963). The defendant orally stipulated that he would take a lie detector
test and that the results of the test would be admissible at the trial. He subsequently
took the 'test but objected to the admission at trial of the reports of the operator, which
were admitted, over his objection, without foundation. The Supreme Court subsequently
reversed Zazzetta's conviction and remanded, holding that since the expertise of the
operator and interpreter of test results has substantial bearing on the reliability of such
tests, and since the operator was not available for cross-examination, the reports were
improperly admitted. The court discussed the controversy of scientific reliability of the
Polygraph, but expressly refused to take sides in that argument and rested its decision
upon the narrow issue of the admissibility of the operator's report only.
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defendant again stipulated. The result was the same; the prosecu-
tion went ahead nevertheless and tried the case. At the trial the
defendant offered into evidence the results of the tests but the
state's objection was sustained. It must be noted that the experts
were not called to the stand; only their reports were offered in
evidence.
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
may well have been influenced by these test results, especially
since the district attorney testified on trial that he had told the
defendant if the tests were favorable to the latter that the prosecu-
tion would have to look elsewhere for the guilty party. The high
court said that although the findings of the lie detector experts
were properly excluded from the jury, it regarded the results as
very significant.
This case was followed by People v. Houser,26 in 1948, where-
in the defendant and his counsel signed a written stipulation with
the prosecuting attorney, agreeing that the defendant would take
a lie detector test, and agreeing that the opinions and findings of
the operator would be offered as evidence for the state or for the
defendant. The defendant also stipulated that the operator was
duly qualified and further waived his constitutional privilege
against self-incriminaton. The results indicated that he was not
telling the truth. At the trial, defense counsel objected to the
admission in evidence of the operator's testimony, but his objec-
tion was overruled.
On appeal, he argued that since lie detector evidence has not
received evidentiary recognition, it was error to admit the results
of the test. The Appellate Court dismissed defendant's argument
summarily in stating:
It would be difficult to hold that defendant should now be per-
mitted on this appeal to take advantage of any claim that the opera-
tor.., was not an expert and that as to the results of the test such
evidence was inadmissible, merely because it happened to indicate
that he was not telling the truth.
27
In Boeche v. State,28 the defendant submitted to a lie detector
26 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948).
27 Id. at 691, 193 P.2d at 942.
28 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).
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test after entering into an agreement with the prosecution that she
would be released if the test demonstrated her innocence. The lie
detector operator found that the defendant was telling the truth,
but the state reneged on its agreement. The Nebraska Supreme
Court held that the stipulation was not binding on the state since
the lie detector had not achieved scientific acceptance. But the
dissenting Justice Chappell thought that the time had come for a
judicial acceptance of lie detector test results upon proof of the
examiner's competence. 9
In 1957, a defendant charged with robbery orally stipulated
to be bound by the results of tests with a polygraph but objected
to the introduction of the results at the trial. The court seemed to
intimate that it would be inclined to admit such evidence if the
parties had entered into a written stipulation, but held that the
lack of formality in orally stipulating to an agreement of such
importance precluded the admission of the test results."
In State v. McNamara,3 the defendant agreed in writing to
submit to a polygraph test which turned out to be unfavorable to
her. At the trial, she strenuously objected to the admission of the
test results, but the trial court overruled the objection. On appeal
the lie detector evidence was held properly admitted by reason
of the agreement.
The following year, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that the admission of lie test results over objection of the
defendant, even though the latter had signed a waiver agreeing
to be bound by the test, was error, since the signing of a waiver
did not alter the rule as to admissibility. 2 The court seems to have
been unaware of any other decision which held such evidence
admissible and makes no mention of the Houser and McNamara
cases.
Finally, in 1962 the Arizona Supreme Court, in State v.
Valdez, 3 at the request of the trial court, formulated the rule that
29 Id. at 379, 37 N.W.2d at 600.
30 Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957). This decision was
rendered prior to the enactment of the polygraph operators' licensing law.
31 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
32 State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
33 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
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when parties in either a civil or criminal case stipulate to the
admission of lie detector test results, such results might be ad-
mitted into evidence, providing: (1) the stipulation was in writ-
ing between both parties and their counsels (or between the city
attorney, the defendant and his counsel) ; (2) an adequate founda-
tion as to the examiner's qualifications and the conditions under
which the test was given was laid; (3) that the admissibility of the
evidence, notwithstanding the stipulation, is at the discretion of
the trial judge who rules on the qualifications of the examiner;
and (4) that the judge instruct the jury that the expert's testimony
does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the case, but
tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination the
subject was or was not telling the truth.
In the absence of a written stipulation, no reviewing tribunal
has, as yet, upheld the admissibility of evidence tending to show
the results of lie detector examinations. The courts have given
various reasons to justify their position. The most common argu-
ment is that lie detection has not yet gained general scientific
acceptance, a reiteration of the Frye case principle.34 Other courts
excluded lie detector evidence because it was the most glaring type
of hearsay,8 5 or because no foundation was laid,8 6 or because its
admission would impair the vital function of cross-examination
since the machine escapes all examination.37 One court excluded
the evidence because the test was not proved scientifically reliable
and observed that there are "several valid" reasons for exclusion
apart from lack of scientific acceptance, but did not state these
reasons.
3 8
WHY IS JUDICIAL RECOGNITION WITHHELD?
In examining the decisions, many of the arguments and rea-
sons given for the refusal to admit into evidence the results of lie
34 Frye v. United States, supra n.15. See also Commonwealth v. McKinley, 181 Pa.
Super. 610, 123 A.2d 735 (1956).
85 United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278 (D.C.N.Y. 1960).
36 Colbert v. Commonwealth, supra n.30. The court did not specify what would
have been an adequate foundation. Accord, State v. Walker, 37 N.J. 208, 181 A.2d 1
(1962); Looper v. State, 381 P.2d 1018 (Okla, Crim. 1963).
87 State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P2d 147 (1947). Accord, Boeche v. State, supra
n.28.
88 Lee v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 233, 105 S.w.2d 152 (1959).
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detector examinations seem unconvincing. The general acceptance
of a test or experiment by the majority of scientists should be the
criterion for taking judicial notice of scientfic facts, not its basis
for admissibility. 9 Many courts are in accord with this view, and
have repeatedly stated that the fact that scientists differ on the
validity of particular tests or experiments goes to the issue of
weight and not to admissibility." Furthermore, what "general
scientific acceptance" are the courts talking about? Is it general
scientific acceptance among medical men, psychiatrists, policemen,
law professors, or polygraph operators? Many of the detractors of
lie detection as a science or art-there seems to be no unanimity
on this point-are outstanding men in their own field but have
never actually studied the polygraph, the interrogation techniques
and other problems connected with such tests. Their writings
and opinions are of an ever greater "glaring type of hearsay" than
the proffered evidence in the Stromberg case.4 1
A prominent medical man asserted that to establish the quali-
fications and standards for a polygraph operator is a most difficult
and hazardous task. Medical training, like virtue, is always desir-
able, but on the other hand a degree of M.D. is in and of itself
no more a qualification for a successful polygraph operator than
the lack of a medical degree is a bar to it.42 It is matter of common
knowledge that the "scientific community" in practically every
science, even in the exact sciences of physics, chemistry, etc.,
harbors a great deal of differences of opinion concerning proce-
dures and techniques-by experts in that field. Needless to say,
when they go into another person's field, they are no longer
competent.
The argument of inaccuracy or chance of error is unsound
today, because in the present state of development of lie detection
a high degree of accuracy is achieved with the polygraph. Courts
sometimes erroneously rely upon conservative estimates of accuracy
made many years ago to justify their conclusion of unreliability.
39 McCormick, Evidence § 170 (1954).
40 E.g., People v. Bobczyk, 343 I1. App. 504, 99 N.E.2d 567 (1951) (drunkometer
test); State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 267 P.2d 893 (1954) (intoxication test).
41 United States v. Stromberg, supra n.35.
42 Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 58 (1942).
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Thus in Commonwealth v. Fatalo,48 the court erroneously used a
conservative estimate that the accuracy of lie detection tests must
be fixed somewhere around seventy-five percent to eighty percent
in support of its contention that the lie detector is too unreliable
and the margin of error too great. This estimate was made by
Professor Inbau in 1942.44
Dean William Wicker of the University of Tennessee College
of Law, in discussing Inbau's book, stresses the point that Inbau
does not assert that there is a margin of twenty-five percent positive
error, but that Inbau's analysis indicates that findings are indefinite
in twenty percent of those tested. The maximum probable error
is less than five percent.45 Also, let's not forget that Inbau made
this statement more than twenty years ago. In weighing the issues,
the same author furthermore writes:
Lie-detector tests, when conducted by competent and experi-
enced operators, are of considerable practical utility. In the first
place, with the aid of a lie-detector, it is possible to detect decep-
tion with much greater accuracy than is otherwise attainable.46
In the same Fatalo decision,47 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court also cited an article written by Professor Skolnick
in support of its decision. 48 However, much of Skolnick's lengthy
text is in the abstract, ignoring practical facts and recent statistics,
while failing to conclusively document his position adverse to the
lie detector.
A more enlightened study, with exhaustive statistics, was
published in 1960 by Richard 0. Arther, President of Scientific Lie
Detection of New York City.49 Arther studied 7400 actual cases
over a period of seven years. He reports that the polygraph tech-
nique has a ninety-five percent accuracy, with less than a four
percent margin of inconclusive determination, and a one percent
margin of maximum possible error. Other statistical research
43 191 N.E.2d 479 (Mass. 1963).
44 Inbau, op. cit. supra n.42, at pp. 54-55.
45 Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 Tenn. L. Rev.
711, 713 (1953).
46 Inbau, op. cit. supra n.42, at p. 54.
47 Commonwealth v. Fatalo, supra n.43.
48 Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection,
70 Yale L.J. 694 (1961).
49 Arther, The Lie Detector-Is It of Any Value?, 24 Fed. Probation 36 (Dec. 1960).
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indicates a high degree of accuracy in the results obtained by
means of lie detector tests. As one writer observed, the machine
used in polygraphic work is extremely accurate mechanically, and
is probably almost as good as it will ever be.50
Why, then, are the courts so reluctant in extending judicial
recognition to the polygraph? The reasons other than unreliability
assigned by the courts as justifying their refusal to admit evidence
of this type are equally "transparent." While undoubtedly justifi-
able in individual cases, the assigned reasons should not be re-
garded as formulating general rules.
The general acceptance rule does not require an absolute
infallibility as a standard for admission of scientific evidence.5 '
Courts have freely accepted in evidence testimony tending to show
the results of dermal nitrate tests for gunpowder residues,52 yet
these tests are by no means considered infallible and have been
discredited as totally unreliable by experts and other courts.5 3 It
seems also strange that the courts continue to refuse to accept in
evidence the results of lie tests on the basis of a "lack of general
scientific acceptance," while stating in the same breath that the
lie detector is a useful instrument in criminal investigations and
advocating its use in law enforcement.
5 4
50 Burack, A Critical Analysis of the Theory, Method, and Limitations of the "Lie
Detector," 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 414 (1956); the author indicates that an accuracy of
over 99% may be expected if the tests are conducted by qualified operators.
51 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962). However, the court added that
a greater standardization of the instrument, technique and examiner's qualifications, as
well as endorsement by a larger segment of the psychological and physiological branches
of science must be obtained before it would permit the use of lie detector evidence in the
courtroom in the absence of stipulation.
In People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958), it was said that
scientific acceptance by a profession as a whole is not necessary; that in this day of
specialization, it is sufficient foundation for the admissibility of scientific evidence to
show that the particular scientific test involved has been accepted generally by a limited
few who would be expected to be familiar with its use.
52 State v. Foster, 44 Hawaii 403, 354 P.2d 960 (1960); Commonwealth v. Westwood,
342 Pa. 289, 188 Ad. 304 (1936); Henson v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 647, 266 S.W.2d 864
(1953).
53 Brooks v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959). See also: Turkel & Lipman,
Unreliability of Dermal Nitrate Test for Gunpowder, 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 281 (1955).
At the first seminar on the scientific aspects of police work conducted by the Inter-
national Criminal Police (Interpol) in 1963, the participating crime experts of the several
countries, including the U.S.A., unanimously considered the traditional paraffin (dermal
nitrate) test to be of no value whatsoever, neither as evidence to be put before the
courts, nor even as a sure indication for the police officer. 19 Intern. Crim. Pol. Rev. 25,
28 (Jan. 1964).
54 State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43, 189 S.W.2d 541 (1945). Similar observa-
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The argument that the admission of lie detector evidence
would tend to eliminate the function of the jury as a fact finding
body can be met by a bench instruction to the jury that the expert
testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the
crime, but tends only to indicate that at the time of the examina-
tion the subject was or was not telling the truth.55 It would still
remain for the jury to determine what corroborative weight and
effect such testimony should be given. 56
The right to an effective cross-examination is not impaired by
the admission of lie detector evidence. The machine does not
testify; the operator testifies as to conclusions he has drawn from
the test, much like a doctor interprets for the jury the x-ray picture
he has taken.
There is an almost absolute dearth of case material on the
problem of laying a foundation for the admission of findings of lie
detector tests for the simple reason that no appellate court has yet
upheld the admissibility of such evidence in the absence of a
stipulation. According to well established principles of evidence,
before the results of a new technique or scientific test can be
admitted into evidence, the party offering testimony as to the
results of such tests must establish: (1) that the test has gained
widespread scientific recognition; (2) that adequate test condi-
tions were met in order to insure an accurate result; (3) that the
operator or examiner was competent in his line of work.
Wigmore has said, "All that should be required as a condition
[to admission in evidence] is the preliminary testimony of a scien-
tist that the proposed test is an accepted one in his profession and
that it has a reasonable measure of precision in its indications. 5T
Today the lie detector more than meets these requirements.
tions were made in State v. Lowry, supra n.37; Leeks v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 326, 245
P.2d 764 (1952). In Davis v. State, 106 Tex. Crim. 456, 308 S.W.2d 880 (1957), the court
said that while the admission of lie detector test results is reversible error, this in no
way condemns their use as a means of interrogation and investigation.
55 State v. Valdez, supra n.33.
56 This allegation also raises the question whether or not practically ALL findings of
expert witnesses invade the province of the jury?
57 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 990 (3d ed. 1940).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONCLUSION
The time has come for our courts to reevaluate their attitude
toward mechanical truth detection tests. Dean Wicker pointed
out that all those connected with our courts know that today inten-
tional perjury at the trial has become almost commonplace. In
many instances it is very difficult, if not impossible, even for the
experienced trial lawyer, to expose on cross-examination the many
lies of perjuring witnesses. "The legal profession can no longer
continue to assume a complacent attitude concerning our present
methods of exposing mendacity." 5 The polygraph is widely used
to check employee loyalty and honesty. Banks, insurance com-
panies, industrial concerns use it daily for employee screening.
Prudent lawyers even send their clients and witnesses to polygraph
operators to avoid the embarassing experience of hearing a totally
different story on cross-examination.
For the past twenty-five years, lie detector test results have
been admitted in evidence in criminal, quasi-criminal, and in civil
cases by a group of liberal and progressive judges of the Municipal
Court of Chicago in cases where there was no evidence other than
contradictory testimony of parties willing to submit to polygraph
testing.59
The researchers have proven, and tests have demonstrated,
that the lie detector is a very accurate machine, when handled by
a competent and experienced operator.60 Under such circum-
stances, there is no scientific or legal reason why the results of an
examination by means of a lie detector, administered with the
consent of the subject and his counsel by a qualified operator,
should not be admitted in evidence.
In the Frye case,61 cited as a blanket "precedent" for the unre-
liability of the lie detector, a systolic blood pressure test method
58 Wicker, op cit. supra n.45, at 712.
59 Reid, The Lie Detector in Court, 4 DePaul L. Rev. 31, 39 (1954). The author is
firmly convinced that lie detector results should be admitted as evidence upon an agree-
ment and stipulation entered into beforehand with opposing counsel.
60 Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 743 (1953). At p. 765 the
author said: "Here is a good method in qualified hands. . . . It is both scientific and
democratic. While not usurping the places of other forms of scientific evidence, it must
be given its rightful seat in the courtroom."
61 Frye v. United States, supra n.15.
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was used. This method has been found to be inadequate and
would not have complied with the requirements of the new Illinois
law.62 Today's instruments record pulse rate, blood pressure,
respiration and usually perspiration. The time has come to over-
turn the Frye holding as an anachronism, and to admit evidence
as to the results of a polygraph test administered by a well qualified
and experienced expert to a willing subject. It seems totally in-
congruous for our courts to keep hammering on the unreliability
of lie detector tests, and at the same time admit into evidence the
results of a test taken under a formal written stipulation. There
is no judicial magic in such a stipulation. "If lie detector tests are
as unpredictable and misleading as the courts are so certain they
are, then their reliability and usefulness to the court and jury . ..




62 I1. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, § 953 (1963).
63 From the brief for the defense in People v. Zazzetta, 27 Il. 2d 302, 189 N.E.2d
260 (1963).
